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Cooperation in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with two types of players
for increasing number of neighbors
Gyo¨rgy Szabo´ and Attila Szolnoki
Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
We study a spatial two-strategy (cooperation and defection) Prisoner’s Dilemma game with two types (A
and B) of players located on the sites of a square lattice. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed
by iterated strategy adoption from a randomly selected neighbor with a probability depending on the payoff
difference and also on the type of the neighbor. The strategy adoption probability is reduced by a pre-factor
(w < 1) from the players of type B. We consider the competition between two opposite effects when increasing
the number of neighbors (k = 4, 8, and 24). Within a range of the portion of influential players (type A)
the inhomogeneous activity in strategy transfer yields a relevant increase (dependent on w) in the density of
cooperators. The noise-dependence of this phenomenon is also discussed by evaluating phase diagrams.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Cc, 05.50.+q
The investigation of the spatial evolutionary Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) games expands progressively since Nowak and
May [1] reported the maintenance of cooperative behavior
among selfish players. In these models the PD game [2] rep-
resents a pair interaction between two players who can ei-
ther cooperate (C) or defect (D) and their income depends
on both choices in a way forcing both rational (selfish) play-
ers to choose D while they would share equally the maximum
total payoff for mutual cooperation.
In the first model the players are located on a square lat-
tice, they can follow one of the two pure strategies (D and C)
and their income comes from PD games with the neighbors.
During a synchronized strategy update the players adopt the
strategy from the neighbor receiving the highest score. After
this pioneering work many modified versions of the original
model have been suggested and studied (for recent surveys see
[3, 4]). Let us mention only a couple of examples: in some
models larger set of strategies was used [5, 6, 7], in the evo-
lutionary rules noises [8, 9, 10] were introduced that can help
the cooperative behavior [11, 12, 13], and the spatial structure
was also extended by locating the players on different graphs
giving a better description about the connections in human so-
cieties [14, 15, 16, 17]. In the last years the concept of interac-
tion and learning graphs are distinguished [18, 19, 20] and the
research of the co-evolution of strategy distribution and these
graph has also become a promising topic [21, 22, 23]. It is
found, furthermore, that different types of personality [24, 25]
and inhomogeneous activity in the strategy adoption can also
support cooperation [15, 26, 27, 28] particularly if some dis-
tinguished players have higher influence to spread their strate-
gies [29, 30].
In the latter case the relevant increase in the frequency of
cooperators is related to a phenomenon described previously
by Santos et al. [31, 32] who studied evolutionary PD games
on scale-free networks with an evolutionary rule exploiting
the high income for players (called hubs) who have a large
number of neighbors. As a result, on the scale-free networks
the strategy of hubs become an example to be followed by
their neighborhood. Thus, the hubs as influential players face
the consequence of the imitation of their own strategy that
increases (decreases) the income of cooperative (defective)
hubs. After a short transient process this phenomenon favors
the spreading of cooperation because the influential players
can also adopt strategy from each other for suitable connectiv-
ity structures. Evidently, in the absence of links between in-
fluential players the mentioned mechanism cannot help coop-
erators to beat defectors [31, 32, 33]. Recent studies [30, 34]
have indicated that the presence of linked influential players
on scale-free graphs can efficiently promote cooperation (even
for normalized payoffs) if the capability of strategy spreading
differs from player to player. These results raise many inter-
esting questions about the impact of the size of neighborhood
on the frequency of cooperators for inhomogeneous activity
in the strategy transfer.
In the present work we study the competition between two
opposite effects emerging if the average number of neighbors
is increased. On one hand, the above described mechanism
(supporting the spreading of cooperation for inhomogeneous
strategy transfer capability) is enhanced when choosing larger
and larger k. On the other hand, the increase of the number of
neighbors, k, is beneficial for defectors on regular networks
[32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. Here it is worth mentioning that
the mean-field approximation (predicting the extinction of co-
operators in the evolutionary PD games [3, 4]) gives a simple
explanation of this phenomenon. The scope of the present pa-
per is to explore the impact of these two opposite effects by
comparing results obtained for three different sizes of neigh-
borhood. More precisely, the studied types of neighborhood
are the von Neumann neighborhood including only the nearest
neighbors (k = 4), the Moore neighborhood with nearest and
next-nearest neighbors (k = 8), and the case of k = 24 where
players within a 5× 5 box of sites are neighbors of the central
player (self-interaction is excluded). Monte Carlo (MC) sim-
ulations are used to study systematically the effects of payoff,
number of neighbors, and inhomogeneous capability of strat-
egy transfer (for a fixed noise level) on the average number of
cooperators.
For these evolutionary PD game models two types of play-
ers (nx = A or B) are located on the sites x of a square lattice
with a concentration of ν and (1− ν) and their random initial
distribution remains unchanged (quenched) during the simula-
tions. The income of player x comes from one-shot PD games
2with her neighbors, that is,
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
sx ·Asy (1)
where the sum runs over all neighboring sites (Ωx) of player
x, the payoff matrix is defined as suggested by Nowak and
May [1],
A =
(
0 b
0 1
)
, 1 < b < 2 , (2)
and the defective and cooperative strategies are denoted by
unit vectors as
sx = D =
(
1
0
)
or C =
(
0
1
)
. (3)
The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by random
sequential strategy update representing strategy adoption from
a randomly chosen site y to one of its neighbors xwith a prob-
ability
W (sx ← sy) = wy
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/kK]
(4)
dependent on the difference of normalized payoffs (e.g. (Px−
Py)/k) for later convenience of comparisons. For this strat-
egy adoption probability the meaning of the parameter K is
analogous to the temperature as introduced in the kinetic Ising
model and characterizes the magnitude of payoff noise affect-
ing the decision of player x [9, 10]. The multiplicative factor
wy denotes the strategy transfer capability of player y,
wy =
{
1, if ny = A
w, if ny = B , 0 < w < 1 . (5)
In this notation players of type A represent those individuals
who can easily convince their neighbors to adopt the strategy
they are just following. This personal feature can be related to
age, reputation, etc.
For all the three cases studied here the simulations are per-
formed on an L × L square of sites with periodic boundary
conditions. The evolution of the spatial distribution of the C
andD strategies starts from an uncorrelated initial state where
cooperators and defectors are present with the same probabil-
ity. When repeating the above described elementary steps the
system develops into a final stationary state characterized by
the average density of cooperators (ρ). After a suitable re-
laxation time tr ρ is determined by averaging the density of
cooperators over a time ta. Typical (maximum) value of pa-
rameters used in our simulations are the following: L = 400
(1600); tr ≃ ta = 104 (106) MCS [during one MC step
(MCS) each player has a chance once on average to adopt one
of the neighboring strategies]. Pronounced long relaxations
were observed at the large noise limit.
Before discussing the behaviors of the above systems we
briefly recall some general features of the homogeneous sys-
tem (ν = 0 or 1) [41]. The average (total) payoff increases
monotonously with ρ independent of the initial strategy distri-
bution. Furthermore, in each homogeneous system the value
of ρ decreases monotonously from 1 to 0 if b is increased
within a region of b (b(k)c1 (K) < b < b(k)c2 (K)) where the
strategies C and D coexist. For all the three types of neigh-
borhoods b(k)c1 (K) (b(k)c2 (K)) tends to 1 from below (above) if
K → ∞. In other words, in the strong noise limit (K → ∞)
the systems reproduce the behavior of the mean-field model,
that is ρ drops suddenly from 1 to 0 at b = 1. In the oppo-
site case (K → 0) the limit values of b(k)c1 and b(k)c2 depend
on k. When decreasing K the upper critical value of b tends
monotonously to a value (b(k)c1 (0) larger than 1 if k = 8 or 24.
On the contrary, for k = 4, the function b(4)c2 (K) has a local
maximum at K = Kopt ≃ 0.08 (b(4)c2 (K = Kopt) ≃ 1.08)
and approaches 1 if K → 0.
In the light of the above results we first study the density
of cooperators (ρ) when varying the portion of players of type
A for fixed values of payoff (b), strategy transfer capability
(w), and noise (K). The latter was chosen to present optimal
cooperation for k = 4 system (i.e., K ∼= Kopt). The MC data
are compared in Fig. 1 for the three types of neighborhood.
For the sake of comparison, we selected such a high value of b,
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FIG. 1: Density of cooperators as a function of the portion of A
players if b = 1.05, K = 0.1 and w = 0.1 for three different
neighborhoods: k = 4 (open squares); 8 (closed squares); and 24
(closed triangles).
which prevents cooperation in the homogeneous model of k =
24. Figure 1 shows that the highest density of cooperators can
be observed (at ν = 0 or 1) for k = 8 where the overlapping
triangles in the connectivity structure support the spreading
(maintenance) of cooperation as discussed in [12]. The further
increase of k, however, yields a decrease in both ρ and b(k)c2
[32] tending to the behavior of mean-field model. This is the
reason why cooperators become extinct in the final stationary
state for the homogeneous system at k = 24.
Figure 1 demonstrates clearly the existence of an optimum
composition (defined by the maximum in ρ) of the players
A and B. The presence of distinguished players results in a
relatively higher impact on cooperation level for larger k. In
agreement with the expectations, the more neighbors the play-
ers have, the smaller portion of influential players (type A)
3are capable to achieve the highest increase in ρ. The resultant
asymmetry can be observed in the function ρ(ν) for k = 24.
For the largest neighborhood our simulations have clearly in-
dicated that cooperators can remain alive only within a region
of ν with boundaries dependent on w and K . It is expected,
that this region, ν1(w,K) < ν < ν2(w,K), shrinks if we
increase k further.
As the largest effect is found for the largest neighborhood,
henceforth our attention will be focused on the system of
k = 24. Figure 2 illustrates the increase of the density of
cooperators when varying the composition of players A and
B for several values of w at a fixed payoff and noise level.
When the difference is small, typically when 1/w ≤ 2, the
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FIG. 2: Density of cooperators vs. ν for five different values of the
reduced strategy transfer capability (w = 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, and
0.2 from top to bottom) at b = 1.05, k = 24, and K = 0.1.
cooperators cannot remain alive at the given payoffs and noise
independently of the actual composition of A and B play-
ers. If the ratio 1/w is increased then the cooperators can
survive within the above mentioned region of ν. This inter-
val becomes wider and wider while the maximum value of
ρ increases monotonously until reaching its saturation value
(ρ = 1). Consequently, we can observe four subsequent tran-
sitions in Fig. 2 if ν increased for sufficiently high values of
the ratio 1/w. Apparently the density of cooperators tends
to a limit profile if 1/w → ∞. We have to emphasize that
the rigorous analysis of the asymptotic behavior becomes dif-
ficult because the transient time increases with the ratio 1/w
particularly at small values of ν.
We have also studied the effect of the variation of w on the
cooperation level at different payoffs (b). To avoid additional
effects the noise level is fixed at a composition (ν = 0.2) close
to its optimum value. The results, summarized in Fig. 3, illus-
trates that the curves ρ(b) shift to larger b values if the ratio
1/w is increased. (For comparison, the left curve shows the
results obtained in the homogeneous system). The plotted re-
sults refer to a shift proportional to ln(1/w). Due to the above
mentioned increasing run time if we choose larger values of
1/w, the more rigorous (numerical) confirmation of this trend
goes beyond the scope of the present work. Instead of it we
have concentrated on the effect of noise for the two extreme
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FIG. 3: Density of cooperators as a function of b for different values
of 1/w (w = 1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.02m and 0.005 from left to right) at fixed
noise level (K = 0.1), composition (ν = 0.2), and neighborhood
(k = 24).
neighborhoods (k = 4 and 24) at a fixed portion of players A
and B. For this purpose we have performed systematic MC
simulations to determine the critical values bc1 and bc2 for a
fixed ratio of strategy transfer capability (1/w = 50).
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FIG. 4: The upper and lower critical values of b for k = 24 and
ν = 0.2 (open squares connected with dashed lines). Results for
k = 4 and ν = 0.5 are denoted by closed squares (connected with
solid lines) at w = 0.02. The dotted line illustrates the prediction
of mean-field approximation in the homogeneous system (b(mf)
c1 =
b
(mf)
c2 = 1 for arbitrary K).
Figure 4 can be interpreted as a phase diagram where the
connected data represent phase boundaries. Between the up-
per and lower critical points strategies C and D coexist.
Above (below) this region only defectors (cooperators) remain
alive in the final stationary states. For both cases the system
behavior is not affected by the spatial inhomogeneities in the
low noise limit, in agreement with the previous results [29].
In other words, the relevant improvement in the maintenance
of cooperation appears in the noisy systems even for the limit
K → ∞. In contrary to the prediction of mean-field theory
4the present data indicate clearly that cooperators and defectors
can coexist within a region of b if K goes to infinity, that is,
bc1 and bc2 tends to two distinct limit values for both types of
neighborhood. This latter feature has already been confirmed
qualitatively by the pair approximation for k = 4 [29]. No-
tice, furthermore, that the larger neighborhood yields a larger
increase in the value of bc1 and bc2 when applying optimum
composition of players A and B for both systems.
In summary, within the framework of evolutionary PD
games, the present investigation of the effect of the inhomoge-
neous strategy transfer capability on the cooperative behavior
has indicated a relevant increase in the density of cooperators
if the fraction of influential players was close to the optimum
value dependent on the number of neighbors (range of inter-
action) if two types of strategy transfer capability (represented
by the players A and B) are distinguished. It is found that the
larger neighborhood with a less fraction of influential players
(type A) can be more beneficial for the whole system due to
the imitation mechanism rewarding (punishing) cooperation
(defection) for the influential players. The improvement of
cooperation increases with the ratio of strategy transfer capa-
bility (1/w) between players of type A and B. Furthermore,
the maintenance of cooperation is supported remarkably by
the mentioned effect in the high noise limit where the region
of coexistence is broadened and shifted to higher values of b.
For small fraction of players A one can think that the com-
petition between the influential players surrounded by their
followers can be characterized by an effective (rescaled) pay-
off matrix favoring cooperation (as it appears on evolving net-
works [21]) while their competitions are disturbed by those
players of type B who do not belong to the neighborhood of
any influential player. These latter B players can mediate an
interaction between the influential players and/or preserve the
defective behavior. Further research is requested to clarify the
relevance of these opposite effects.
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